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Kinetic market models with single commodity having price fluctuations
Arnab Chatterjee∗ and Bikas K. Chakrabarti†
Theoretical Condensed Matter Physics Division and Centre for Applied Mathematics and Computational Science,
Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, 1/AF Bidhannagar, Kolkata 700064, India.
We study here numerically the behavior of an ideal gas like model of markets having only one
non-consumable commodity. We investigate the behavior of the steady-state distributions of money,
commodity and total wealth, as the dynamics of trading or exchange of money and commodity pro-
ceeds, with local (in time) fluctuations in the price of the commodity. These distributions are
studied in markets with agents having uniform and random saving factors. The self-organizing fea-
tures in money distribution are similar to the cases without any commodity (or with consumable
commodities), while the commodity distribution shows an exponential decay. The wealth distribu-
tion shows interesting behavior: Gamma like distribution for uniform saving propensity and has the
same power-law tail, as that of the money distribution, for a market with agents having random
saving propensity.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh,89.75.Hc,89.75.Da,43.38.Si
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of wealth distribution [1] in a society has re-
mained an intriguing problem since Vilfredo Pareto who
first observed [2] that the number of rich people with
wealth m decay following an inverse power-law:
P (m) ∼ m−(1+ν). (1)
P (m) is the number density of people possessing wealth
m and ν is known as the Pareto exponent. This exponent
generally assumes a value between 1 and 3 in different
economies and times [1, 3, 4, 5]. It is also known that
for low and medium income, the number density P (m)
falls off much faster: exponentially [3] or in a log-normal
way [4].
In recent years, easy availability of data in electronic
media has helped in the analysis of wealth or income
distributions in various societies [1]. It is now more or
less established that the distribution has a power-law tail
for the large (about 5% of the population) wealth/income
while the majority (around 95%) low income distribution
fits well to Gibbs or log-normal form [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
There have been several attempts to model a simple
economy with minimum trading ingredients, which in-
volve a wealth exchange process [1] that produce a distri-
bution of wealth similar to that observed in the real mar-
ket. We are particularly interested in microscopic models
of markets where the (economic) trading activity is con-
sidered as a scattering process [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
(see also Ref. [15] for recent extensive reviews). We con-
centrate on models that incorporate ‘saving propensity’
(of the agents) as an essential ingredient in a trading
process, and reproduces the salient features seen across
wealth distributions in varied economies (see Ref. [16] for
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a review). Much earlier, Angle [17] studied an inequal-
ity process, which can be mapped to the uniform savings
models is certain cases; see Ref. [18] for a detailed review.
These studies also show (and discussed briefly here)
how the distribution of savings can be modified to re-
produce the salient features of empirical distributions of
wealth – namely the shape of the distribution for the low
and middle wealth and the tunable Pareto exponent. In
all these models [9, 10, 11, 12, 13], ‘savings’ was intro-
duced as a quenched parameter that remained invariant
with time (or trading).
Apart from presenting a brief summary in Section II
(giving the established results in such models), we present
new results for a similar (gas like) market model, where
the exchange is for a non-consumable commodity (glob-
ally conserved, like money). We find, although the details
of the steady-state money and wealth (money and com-
modity together) distributions differ considerably, the
same Pareto tail feature appears in both, with identical
exponent (ν) value.
II. IDEAL-GAS LIKE MODELS OF TRADING
MARKETS WITHOUT ANY COMMODITY
A. Without savings
We first consider an ideal-gas model of a closed eco-
nomic system. Wealth is measured in terms of the
amount of money possessed by an individual. Production
is not allowed i.e, total money M is fixed and also there
is no migration of population i.e, total number of agents
N is fixed, and the only economic activity is confined to
trading. Each agent i, individual or corporate, possess
money mi(t) at time t. In any trading, a pair of agents i
and j randomly exchange their money [7, 8, 9], such that
their total money is (locally) conserved and none posses
negative money (mi(t) ≥ 0, i.e, debt not allowed):
mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) + ∆m; mj(t+ 1) = mj(t)−∆m
2∆m = ǫ(mi(t) +mj(t))−mi(t); 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 (2)
All the money transactions considered in this paper fol-
low local conservation:
mi(t) +mj(t) = mi(t+ 1) +mj(t+ 1). (3)
The time (t) changes by one unit after each trading and ǫ
is a random fraction chosen independently for each trad-
ing or at each time t. The steady-state (t → ∞) distri-
bution of money is Gibbs one:
P (m) = (1/T ) exp(−m/T );T =M/N. (4)
No matter how uniform or justified the initial distribu-
tion is, the eventual steady state corresponds to Gibbs
distribution where most of the people have very little
money. This follows from the conservation of money and
additivity of entropy:
P (m1)P (m2) = P (m1 +m2).
This steady state result is quite robust and realistic. Sev-
eral variations of the trading [1], does not affect the dis-
tribution.
In any trading, savings come naturally [19]. A sav-
ing factor λ is therefore introduced in the same model [9]
(Ref. [8] is the model without savings), where each trader
at time t saves a fraction λ of its money mi(t) and trades
randomly with the rest. In each of the following two
cases, the savings fraction does not vary with time, and
hence we call it ‘quenched’ in the terminology of statis-
tical mechanics.
B. Uniform savings
For the case of ‘uniform’ savings, the money exchange
rules remain the same (Eqn. (2)), where
∆m = (1− λ)[ǫ{mi(t) +mj(t)} −mi(t)], (5)
where ǫ is a random fraction, coming from the stochastic
nature of the trading. λ is a fraction (0 ≤ λ < 1) which
we call the saving factor.
The market (non-interacting at λ = 0 and 1) becomes
effectively ‘interacting’ for any non-vanishing λ (< 1):
For uniform λ (same for all agents), the steady state dis-
tribution Pf (m) of money is sharply decaying on both
sides with the most-probable money per agent shifting
away from m = 0 (for λ = 0) to M/N as λ → 1.
The self-organizing feature of this market, induced by
sheer self-interest of saving by each agent without any
global perspective, is very significant as the fraction of
paupers decrease with saving fraction λ and most peo-
ple possess some fraction of the average money in the
market (for λ→ 1, the socialists’ dream is achieved with
just people’s self-interest of saving!). This uniform saving
propensity does not give the Pareto-like power-law dis-
tribution yet, but the Markovian nature of the scattering
or trading processes (eqn. (5)) is lost and the system be-
comes co-operative. Through λ, the agents indirectly get
to develop a correlation with (start interacting with) each
other and the system co-operatively self-organizes [20] to-
wards a most-probable distribution.
This model has been understood to a certain extent
(see e.g, [21, 22, 23]), and argued to resemble a gamma
distribution [22], and partly explained analytically. This
model clearly finds its relevance in cases where the econ-
omy consists of traders with ‘waged’ income [24].
C. Distributed savings
In a real society or economy, λ is a very inhomogeneous
parameter: the interest of saving varies from person to
person. We move a step closer to the real situation where
saving factor λ is widely distributed within the popula-
tion [11, 12, 13]. The evolution of money in such a trading
can be written as:
mi(t+ 1) = λimi(t) + ǫ
× [(1− λi)mi(t) + (1− λj)mj(t)] , (6)
mj(t+ 1) = λjmj(t) + (1− ǫ)
× [(1− λi)mi(t) + (1 − λj)mj(t)] (7)
One again follows the same rules (Eqn. (2)) as before,
except that
∆m = (1− λj)ǫmj(t)− (1− λi)(1 − ǫ)mi(t) (8)
here; λi and λj being the saving propensities of agents
i and j. The agents have uniform (over time) saving
propensities, distributed independently, randomly and
uniformly (white) within an interval 0 to 1 agent i saves
a random fraction λi (0 ≤ λi < 1) and this λi value is
quenched for each agent (λi are independent of trading
or t). P (m) is found to follow a strict power-law decay.
This decay fits to Pareto law (1) with ν = 1.01± 0.02 for
several decades. This power law is extremely robust: a
distribution
ρ(λ) ∼ |λ0 − λ|
α, λ0 6= 1, 0 ≤ λ < 1, (9)
of quenched λ values among the agents produce power
law distributed m with Pareto index ν = 1, irrespective
of the value of α. For negative α values, however, we
get an initial (small m) Gibbs-like decay in P (m). In
case λ0 = 1, the Pareto exponent is modified to ν =
1+ α, which qualifies for the non-universal exponents in
the same model [11, 25].
This model [11] has been thoroughly analyzed, and the
analytical derivation of the Pareto exponent has been
achieved in certain cases [23, 25, 26]. The Pareto expo-
nent has been derived to exactly 1.
In this model, agents with higher saving propensity
tend to hold higher average wealth, which is justified by
the fact that the saving propensity in the rich population
is always high [28].
3III. IDEAL-GAS TRADING MARKET IN
PRESENCE OF A NON-CONSUMABLE
COMMODITY
In the above markets, modifications due to exchange
of a consumable commodity hardy affects the distribu-
tion, as the commodity once bought or sold need not be
accounted for. Consumable commodities effectively have
no ‘price’, as due to their short lifetime to contribute to
the total wealth of an individual. It is interesting how-
ever, to study the role of non-consumable commodities
in such market models and this we do here.
In the simplified version of a market with a single
non-consumable commodity, we again consider a fixed
number of traders or agents N who trade in a market
involving total money
∑
imi(t) = M and total com-
modity
∑
i ci(t) = C, mi(t) and ci(t) being the money
and commodity of the i-th agent at time t and are both
non-negative. Needless to mention, both mi(t) and ci(t)
change with time or trading t. The market, as before is
closed, which means, N , M and C are constants. The
wealth wi of an individual i is thus, the sum of the money
and commodity it possesses, i.e., wi = mi + p0ci; p0 is
the “global” price. In course of trading, total money and
total commodity are locally conserved, and hence the to-
tal wealth. In such a market, one can define a global
average price parameter p0 = M/C, which is set here
to unity, giving wi = mi + ci. It may be noted here
that in order to avoid the complication of restricting the
commodity-money exchange and their reversal between
the same agents, the Fisher velocity of money circulation
(see e.g., Ref. [29]) is renormalised to unity here. In or-
der to accommodate the lack of proper information and
the ability of the agents to bargain etc., we will allow of
course fluctuations δ in the price of the commodities at
any trading (time): p(t) = p0 ± δ = 1 ± δ. We find, the
nature of steady state to be unchanged and independent
of δ, once it becomes nonvanishing.
A. Dynamics
In general, the dynamics of money in this market looks
the same as Eqn. (2), with ∆m given by Eqns. (2), (5)
or (8) depending on whether λi = 0 for all, λi 6= 0
but uniform for all i or λi 6= λj respectively. How-
ever, all ∆m are not allowed here; only those, for which
∆mi ≡ mi(t+1)−mi(t) or ∆mj are allowed by the cor-
responding changes ∆ci or ∆cj in their respective com-
modities (∆m > 0,∆c > 0):
ci(t+ 1) = ci(t) +
mi(t+ 1)−mi(t)
p(t)
(10)
cj(t+ 1) = cj(t)−
mj(t+ 1)−mj(t)
p(t)
(11)
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FIG. 1: Steady state distribution P (m) of money m in a
market with no savings (saving factor λ = 0) for no price
fluctuations i.e, δ = 0. The graphs show simulation results for
a system of N = 100 agents,M/N = 1, C/N = 1; mi = 1 = ci
at t = 0 for all agents i. The inset shows the distribution P (w)
of total wealth w = m + c. As p = 1, for δ = 0, although m
and c can change with tradings within the limit (0 − 2) the
sum is always maintained at 2.
where p(t) is the local-time ‘price’ parameter, a stochastic
variable:
p(t) =
{
1 + δ with probability 0.5
1− δ with probability 0.5
. (12)
The role of the stochasticity in p(t) is to imitate the effect
of bargaining in a trading process. δ parametrizes the
amount of stochasticity. The role of δ is significant in
the sense that it determines the (relaxation) time the
whole system takes to reach a dynamically equilibrium
state; the system reaches equilibrium sooner for larger
δ, while its magnitude does not affect the steady state
distribution. It may be noted that, in course of trading
process, certain exchanges are not allowed (e.g., in cases
when a particular pair of traders do not have enough
commodity to exchange in favor of an agreed exchange
of money). We then skip these steps and choose a new
pair of agents for trading.
B. Results
For δ = 0, of course, the wealth of each agent re-
mains invariant with time; only the proportion of money
and commodity interchange within themselves, since the
‘price’ factor remains constant. This of course happens
irrespective of the savings factor being zero, uniform or
distributed. For δ = 0, the steady state distribution of
money or commodity can take non-trivial forms: (see
Fig. 1), but has strictly a δ-function behavior for the
total wealth distribution; it gets frozen at the value of
wealth one starts with (see inset of Fig. 1 for the case
mi = 1 = ci for all i).
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FIG. 2: Steady state distribution P (m) of money m in the
uniform savings commodity market for different values of sav-
ing factor λ (0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 from left
to right near the origin) for δ = 0.05. The inset shows the
distribution P (c) of commodity c in the uniform savings com-
modity market for different values of saving factor λ. The
graphs show simulation results for a system of N = 100
agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
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FIG. 3: Steady state distribution P (w) of total
wealth w = m + c in the uniform savings com-
modity market for different values of saving factor λ
(0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 from left to right) for
δ = 0.05. The graphs show simulation results for a system of
N = 100 agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
As mentioned already for δ 6= 0, the steady state re-
sults are not dependent on the value of δ (the relaxation
time of course decreases with increasing δ). In such a
market with uniform savings, money distribution P (m)
has a form similar to a set (for λ 6= 0) of Gamma func-
tions (see Fig. 2): a set of curves with a most-probable
value shifting from 0 to 1 as saving factor λ changes from
0 to 1 (as in the case without any commodity). The
commodity distribution P (c) has an initial peak and an
exponential fall-off, without much systematics with vary-
ing λ (see inset of Fig. 2). The distribution P (w) of total
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FIG. 4: Steady state distribution P (m) of money m in the
commodity market with distributed savings 0 ≤ λ < 1. P (m)
has a power-law tail with Pareto index ν = 1± 0.02 (a power
law function x−2 is given for comparison). The inset shows
the distribution P (c) of commodity c in the same commodity
market. The graphs show simulation results for a system of
N = 1000 agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
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FIG. 5: Steady state distribution P (w) of total wealth w =
m+ c in the commodity market with distributed savings 0 ≤
λ < 1. P (w) has a power-law tail with Pareto index ν = 1±
0.05 (a power law function x−1 is given for comparison). The
inset shows the cumulative distribution Q(w) ≡
R∞
w
P (w)dw.
The graphs show simulation results for a system of N = 1000
agents, M/N = 1, C/N = 1.
wealth w = m + c behaves much like P (m) (see Fig. 3).
It is to be noted that since there is no precise correspon-
dence with commodity and money for δ 6= 0 (unlike when
δ = 0, when the sum is fixed), P (w) cannot be derived
directly from P (m) and P (c). However, there are fur-
ther interesting features. Although they form a class of
Gamma distributions, the set of curves for different val-
ues of saving factor λ seem to intersect at a common
point, near w = 1. All the reported data are for a system
of N = 100 agents, with M/N = 1 and C/N = 1 and for
a case where the noise level δ equals 10%.
5For λ distributed uniformly within the interval 0 ≤
λ < 1, the tails of both money and wealth distributions
P (m) and P (w) have Pareto law behavior with a fitting
exponent value ν = 1±0.02 and ν = 1±0.05 respectively
(see Figs. 4 and 5 respectively), whereas the commodity
distribution is still exponentially decaying (see inset of
Fig. 4).
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Let us first summarize the results for the models
without any commodity (money-only exchange models):
There are N players participating in a game, each hav-
ing an initial capital of one unit of money. N is very
large, and total money M = N remains fixed over the
game (so also the number of players N). (a) In the sim-
plest version, the only move at any time is that two of
these players are randomly chosen and they decide to
share their total money randomly among them. As one
can easily guess, the initial uniform (a delta function)
distribution of money will soon disappear. Let us ask
what the eventual steady state distribution of money af-
ter many such moves will be? At each move, a pair of
randomly chosen players share a random fraction of their
total money among themselves. The answer is well es-
tablished in physics for more than a century — soon,
there will be a stable money distribution and it will be
Gibbs distribution: P (m) ∼ exp[−m/T ]; T = M/N [8].
(b) Now think of a modified move in this game: each
player ‘saves’ a fraction λ of the money available with
him/her after each move and while going to the next
move. Everybody saves the same fraction λ. What is the
steady state distribution of money after a large number
of such moves? It becomes Gamma-function like, while
the distribution parameters of course depend on λ (see
Ref. [9, 22]) see also Ref. [17, 18]; for a somewhat different
model with similar results developed much earlier. No ex-
act treatment of this problem is available so far. (c) What
happens to the eventual money distribution among these
players if λ is not the same for all players but is different
for different players? Let the distribution ρ(λ) of saving
propensity λ be such that ρ(λ) is non-vanishing when
λ → 1. The actual distribution will depend on the sav-
ing propensity distribution ρ(λ), but for all of them, the
asymptotic form of the distribution will become Pareto-
like: P (m) ∼ m−α; α = 2 for m → ∞. This is valid
for all such distributions (unless ρ(λ) ∝ (1 − λ)β , when
P (m) ∼ m−(2+β)). However, for variation of ρ(λ) such
that ρ(λ)→ 0 for λ < λ0, one will get an initial Gamma
function form for P (m) for small and intermediate val-
ues of m, with parameters determined by λ0 (6= 0), and
this distribution will eventually become Pareto-like for
m → ∞ [11, 12, 23]. A somewhat rigorous analytical
treatment of this problem is now available [25].
A major limitation of these money-only exchange mod-
els considered earlier [1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27] (and summarised in (a),
(b) and (c) above) is that it does not make any explicit
reference to the commodities exchanged with the money
and to the constraints they impose. Also, the wealth is
not just the money is possession (unless the commod-
ity exchanged with the money is strictly consumable).
Here, we study the effect of a single non-consumable com-
modity on the money (and also wealth) distributions in
the steady state, allowing for the total (in time) price
fluctuation. This allowance of price fluctuation here is
very crucial for the model; it allows for the stochastic
dynamics to play its proper role in the market. As such,
this model is therefore quite different from that consid-
ered recently in Ref. [30], where p0 is strictly unity and
the stochasticity enters from other exogenous factors. In
the sense that we also consider two exchangeable vari-
ables in the market, our model has some similarity with
that in Ref [31]. However, Silver et al [31] consider only
random exchanges between them (keeping the total con-
served) while we consider random exchanges permitting
price fluctuations and savings. As such they get only the
Gamma distribution in wealth, while we get both Gamma
and Pareto distributions.
In spite of many significant effects due to the inclu-
sion of a non-consumable commodity, the general feature
of Gamma-like form of the money (and wealth) distri-
butions (for uniform λ) and the power law tails for both
money and wealth (for distributed λ) with identical expo-
nents, are seen to remain unchanged. The precise studies
(theories) for the money-only exchange models are there-
fore extremely useful and relevant.
Specifically, we study here numerically the behavior of
an ideal gas like model of markets having only one non-
consumable commodity. The total amount of money in
the market M =
∑
imi, i = 1, . . . , N is fixed, so is the
total amount of commodity C =
∑
i ci and of course
the total number of agents N in the market. As in
the market there is only one commodity, which is non-
consumable, we normalize its global price p0 = M/C to
unity. The wealth of any agent i at any time t is therefore
wi(t) = mi(t)+ci(t). If no fluctuation in price p is allowed
(over p0), then the money-commodity exchange leads to
trivial money and commodity distribution as shown in
Fig. 1, which keeps the wealth of any agent unchanged
over time. If we now allow the price p(t) at any time
to fluctuate over p0 by a factor δ (as in (12)), nontrivial
money, commodity and wealth distributions set in (the
steady states of which are independent of δ; δ 6= 0). We
investigated here the behavior of the steady-state distri-
butions of money, commodity and total wealth, as this
dynamics of trading or exchange of money or commod-
ity proceeds, allowing for temporal fluctuations in the
price of the commodity. These distributions are studied
in markets with agents having uniform (see Figs. 2 and
3) and random saving factors (see Figs. 4 and 5). The
self-organizing features in money distribution are similar
to the cases without any commodity (or with consumable
commodities), the commodity distribution shows an ex-
ponential decay. The wealth distribution shows interest-
6ing behavior: Gamma like distribution for uniform saving
propensity and has a power-law tail (with Pareto expo-
nent value ν = 1) for a market with agents having ran-
dom saving propensity. Although our results are numer-
ical, and the Pareto behavior for the wealth distribution
tail gets somewhat more restricted in range (compared
to that of the money distribution; see Fig. (4)), the ro-
bustness of the power-law behavior nevertheless becomes
obvious from, say Fig. (4), where the power law tail for
the money distribution clearly dominates over the com-
modity distribution tail, which rapidly decays off expo-
nentially.
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